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Abstract
My aim here is to describe how meaningful communication is gen-
erated from embodied interactions between the self and the other. In 
order to do so, first, I revisit and clarify  Merleau-Ponty’s notion of 
intercorporeality based on his texts. Intercorporeality is formulated 
as the reciprocal perception-action loop between the self and the 
other. Perceiving the other’s action prompts the same action in the 
self (e.g., contagious yawning), or its possibility (e.g., smiling), and 
vice versa. It is the process underlying the understanding of inten-
tions in another’s actions. Then, I extend the notion of intercorpore-
ality from the enactive perspective. Since we immediately grasp the 
intention of another’s action through perceiving it, that action ap-
pears as such that affords us to react naturally in response. Thus, 
intercorporeality unfolds as the embodied interaction of action-reac-
tion, which at a certain moment overrides the individual’sintentions 
and gains its own autonomy. It is through this process that intersub-
jectively meaningful communications are created.
Keywords Intercorporeality, Social cognition, Embodied interaction, 
Behavior matching, Interactional synchrony
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Introduction
My aim in this paper is to revisit Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s notion of 
intercorporeality (intercorporéité) and reconsider it in the context of 
current research on social cognition. It is well known that the theory 
of mind (ToM) has long been a central issue in the field of social cog-
nition, and within the theory itself there has been debate between 
proponents of the theory theory (TT) and those supporting the sim-
ulation theory (ST), regarding the nature of our ability to understand 
the other person’s mind (Davies and Stone, 1995; Doherty, 2009).
From the phenomenological perspective, the subject of social cog-
nition belongs to the realm of intersubjectivity. However, before dis-
cussing social cognition as a problem of intersubjectivity it should be 
reconfirmed that current theories of social cognition lack the per-
spective of embodiment (Gallagher, 2005; Gallagher and Zahavi, 
2008; Fuchs and De Jaegher, 2009). Both TT and ST perceive the oth-
er person’s mind as something private and beyond observable bod-
ily behaviors; therefore, one must employ theory or simulation to 
approach it. As Gallagher appropriately points out, “both theory 
theory and simulation theory conceive of communicative interac-
tion between two people as a process that takes place between two 
Cartesian minds” (Gallagher, 2005, p. 211).
Long before ToM, Merleau-Ponty (1964/1951) clearly indicated 
that this point would be a stumbling block in the field of social cog-
nition. Examining an infant’s relationships with other people, he 
questions how social understanding becomes possible for an infant 
if the others’ minds are invisible from the outside and accessible 
only to themselves, as presumed in classical psychology. Moreover, 
he refers to the notion of intercorporeality and attempts to give an 
alternative account of the problem of the other mind. In this paper, 
first, I clarify the notion of intercorporeality based on Merleau-Pon-
ty’s text. Then, I will develop the notion in line with two key ideas 
– “behavior matching” and “interactional synchrony” (Bernieri 
and Rosenthal, 1991). My basic attempt is to re-describe the social 
cognition as a creative process between two lived bodies.
Merleau-Ponty’s notion of intercorporeality
Considering the problem of social understanding, Merleau-Ponty 
urges us to change our view of the mind—“We must abandon the 
fundamental prejudice according to which the psyche is that which 
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is accessible only to myself and cannot be seen from outside” (Mer-
leau-Ponty, 1964/1951, p. 116). Then, he focuses on the relation be-
tween one’s own body and that of the other to illuminate intersub-
jectivity in an alternative way. Here I quote three related passages.
1) In perceiving the other, my body and his are coupled, 
resulting in a sort of action which pairs them. This con-
duct which I am able only to see, I live somehow from 
a distance. I make it mine; I recover it or comprehend 
it. Reciprocally I know that the gestures I make myself 
can be the objects of another’s intention. (Merleau-
Ponty, 1964/1951, p. 118)
To understand this passage, it might be helpful to consider the ex-
ample of yawning. It is a common experience that we cannot help 
yawning when we see someone else yawn. The self perceives the 
other yawn and “live somehow from a distance,” resulting in the 
same action of yawning, which pairs “my body and his.” In other 
words, the self lives another’s action through its own body by per-
ceiving it. In Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty gives an 
example of a baby to describe what one lives through the body in 
perceiving another’s action.
2) A fifteen-month-old baby opens his mouth when I 
playfully take one of his fingers in my mouth and pre-
tend to bite it. … “Biting” immediately has an inter-
subjective signification for him. He perceives his inten-
tions in his body, perceives my body with his own, and 
thereby perceives my intention in his body. (Merleau-
Ponty, 2012/1945, p. 368)
A fifteen-month-old baby, as soon as he perceives the adult’s action 
of biting, echoes the same action even though he does not know 
whether his face structurally corresponds to that of the adult in front 
of him. The baby pre-reflectively acknowledges through his body 
(that is, through his motor capacity) the adult’s intention of biting, 
and as such the intention to bite is shared intersubjectively between 
the baby and the adult. The following passage refers to this point.
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3) Communication or the understanding of gestures is 
achieved through the reciprocity between my inten-
tions and the other person’s gestures, and between 
my gestures and the intentions which can be read in 
the other person’s behavior. Everything happens as if 
the other person’s intention inhabited my body, or as 
if my intentions inhabited his body. (Merleau-Ponty, 
2012/1945, pp. 190–191)
The word “gestures” in this passage could also be read as “actions.” 
There is reciprocity between my intentions and another’s actions, 
and between another’s intentions and my actions. Consider again 
the baby’s case: after perceiving my action of biting, the baby car-
ries out his own intention to bite. The action occurs as if my inten-
tion inhabited the baby’s body. And conversely, as seen in the case 
of my contagious yawning, the action occurred as if another’s in-
tention inhabited my body. Here, an example of smiling can also be 
considered. Generally, smiling is not as contagious as yawning. 
However, when I come upon someone’s innocently smiling face, I 
may feel that the muscles around my mouth are about to mimic the 
same facial expression, even though I do not actually smile (Schil-
bach Eickhoff, Mojzisch and Vogeley, 2008).
Thus, now it is possible to understand the notion of intercorpore-
ality, as shown in Figure 1 (Tanaka, 2013, p. 103). Intercorporeality 
contains a perception-action loop between the self and the other. The 
self’s perception of the other’s action prompts the same action in the 
self (like yawning) or the action’s possibility (like smiling). Con-
versely, the self’s action prompts the same action, or its possibility, in 
the other’s body. Merleau-Ponty expresses this type of relation be-
tween the self’s body and that of the other by stating, “each one of 
us [is] pregnant with the others and confirmed by them in his body” 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1964/1960, p. 181). Therefore, it is understandable 
that intercorporeality is also referred to as “carnal intersubjectivity” 
(intersubjectivité charnelle). Merleau-Ponty aimed to reformulate 
intersubjectivity not as a problem of communication between two 
minds, but between two minded-bodies.
In terms of social cognition, through this reciprocity between bod-
ies, one can directly grasp the intention of another’s action. For the 
self, to perceive another’s action is potentially to perform the same 
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action. Thus, it is through one’s motor capacity that one under-
stands the meanings of the other’s action (Kono, 2005). Our basic 
ability to understand others is perceptual, sensorimotor, and non-
conceptual (Tanaka, 2013). The most primary form of social under-
standing is to grasp directly another’s actions through one’s own 
body, and to find one’s own possibility of actions in another’s body. 
This understanding precedes the theoretical inferences or inner 
simulations put forward in the theories of mind.
Intercorporeality as behavior matching
Since Merleau-Ponty’s death in 1961, many empirical cases have 
been reported in the fields of social and developmental psycholo-
gy that support the notion of intercorporeality. The following cas-
es are well known in these fields:
• Reflexive crying (Simner, 1971): Newborn infants have a strong 
tendency to cry in response to another newborn’s crying. It is 
said to be the earliest stage of empathy.
Figure 1. The structure of intercorporeality
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• Neonate imitation (Meltzoff  & Moore, 1977): Newborn infants 
imitate an adult’s facial expressions, such as opening and closing 
the mouth or sticking out the tongue.
• Matching in vocalization (Capella, 1981): In dyadic interactions, 
infants consistently match their vocalization in timing and dura-
tion to those of the mother.
• Postural congruence (Scheflen, 1964; LaFrance & Broadbent, 
1976): During communication in pairs or in a group, a similarity 
in participants’ postures is often observed (e.g., crossing the legs, 
propping one’s head, and leaning back).
• Motor mimicry (Bavelas, Black, Lemery  & Mullett, 1986): When 
one occasionally comes across another’s emotional expression 
(e.g., wincing for pain), he or she mimics the same movements, 
including facial expressions.
Similar to contagious yawning, these cases involve our natural ten-
dency to imitate the others’ actions. This tendency is observed not 
only in newborns but also in adults, and it includes a broad range of 
nonverbal behavior such as facial expressions, paralanguage, pos-
tures, gestures, movements, and mannerisms, most of which are un-
intended and non-conscious (see Nagaoka, 2006, for a review). In all 
cases, more than two people show a similarity in nonverbal behav-
ior, especially in bodily actions, which Bernieri and Rosenthal (1991) 
comprehensively conceptualize as “behavior matching.”
It would be appropriate to refer to the mirror neuron system in 
this context (Murata, 2005; Rizzolattii and Craighero, 2004). As is 
well known, mirror neurons are a special type of neuron that are 
activated when one performs a specific movement and observes 
someone else performing the same movement. Neurons in the brain 
of an observer reflect the action of another, as if the observer were 
acting in the same way. In fact, it is considered that the primary func-
tion of these neurons is to understand the meaning of another’s ac-
tion (see also Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia, 2008). As seen above, per-
ceiving another’s action does not necessarily provoke the same 
action (like smiling); however, it draws out the possibility of the ac-
tion in the self’s body, that is, “potential behavior matching.” The 
activation of mirror neurons primarily appears to correspond to this 
latent behavioral process. From my viewpoint, the mirror neuron 
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system is one of the neural correlates of intercorporeality: the neural 
basis for the perception-action loop between the self and the other.
As the mirror neuron system is considered to be the basis of em-
pathy (Gallese, 2001), it is reasonable to think that the aspect of in-
tercorporeality that appears as behavior matching forms the un-
derlying process of empathy. Empathy is generally defined as 
understanding the other person on the basis of the vicarious experi-
ence of that person’s feelings, perceptions, and cognitions (Ameri-
can Psychological Association, 2007). Behavior matching, whether it 
remains potential at the neural level or becomes actual at the behav-
ioral level, offers an opportunity for a person to live the same inten-
tionality of the other by experiencing the same action or its possibil-
ity: at what the other laughs, for what the other distorts the face, to 
whom the other speaks in a cheerful tone, and so on. Shared inten-
tionality between two minded-bodies makes empathy between the 
self and the other possible.
However, it is necessary to add that the empathy which we dis-
cuss here along the notion of intercorporeality also includes a more 
profound aspect. When the perception-action loop between the self 
and the other appears as behavior matching, especially as unintend-
ed and non-conscious mimicry, the accompanying feelings or emo-
tions might not belong to the independent mind in a strict sense. For 
example, consider the case of reflexive crying. It is clear that crying 
newborns may share a certain emotion, but it would be difficult to 
know whose emotion it derives from originally. There is a sort of 
empathy that does not derive from one particular individual but 
from the “between” of the self and the other.
This phenomenon might be beyond what can be described 
through the notion of “empathy,” since it is difficult to trace whose 
feelings belong to whom. For the same reason, “emotional conta-
gion” (Hatfield, Cacioppo, and Rapson, 1993) is not a suitable term 
either because the concept of contagion implies that something is 
transferred from one person to the other. For example, consider the 
audience members in a concert hall listening to the music in identi-
cal poses as if mirroring each other. They certainly share a similar 
emotional state and intentionality of consciousness toward the mu-
sic. In this case, both the self and the other appear to merge into the 
same impersonal emotional state. Here I would like to add that Mer-
leau-Ponty also stated, “He and I are like organs of one single inter-
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corporeality” (Merleau-Ponty, 1964/1960, p. 168). Intercorporeali-
ty includes an emotional state that belongs to “we.”
Intercorporeality as interactional synchrony
With a focus on the nonverbal behaviors of interpersonal communi-
cation, intercorporeality appears not only as behavior matching but 
also as a meshing of each other’s actions, which is formally termed 
“interactional synchrony” (Bernieri  & Rosenthal, 1991). Synchrony 
is the concept that “describes the coordination and timing of move-
ments and includes simultaneous movement, tempo similarity, and 
coordination or smoothness” (Trees, 2009, p. 257). In communica-
tion research, behavior matching and interactional synchrony (sim-
ply, matching and meshing) are generally considered to be two 
basic types of interpersonal coordination that occur in social en-
counters with others (Knapp and Hall, 2010).
Similar to the case of behavior matching, various cases of syn-
chrony are also reported in the fields of social and developmental 
psychology. According to the classical findings, two-week-old in-
fants are also able to synchronize movements of their hands, head, 
and legs to an adult’s speech patterns (Condon and Sander, 1974). A 
similar coordination is also seen between adults: the flow of move-
ments in the listener rhythmically corresponds to the speaker’s vo-
calization (Kendon, 1970). Thus, from the very early stage of devel-
opment before ToM is established, the other’s action is perceived as 
something meaningful that provokes a related reaction in the self. 
Social perception requires us to understand it in relation to action.
Synchrony constitutes another phenomenal aspect of intercorpo-
reality because the perception-action loop between the self and the 
other does not always appear as mirroring behavior. Rather, it ap-
pears in much larger part as embodied interactions of action and 
reaction. Perceiving the other’s action, we immediately grasp the 
intention through our motor capacity and react in response to that 
intention. In our daily interactions with others, we more often show 
a meaningful reaction than take a similar action. For instance, if a 
speaker lowers the voice and starts to whisper, the listener will nat-
urally lean closer toward the speaker to identify what is being said. 
If an interaction partner hands a note to the other, the other will 
hold out the hand to receive it without deliberation. The reaction to 
the previous action then induces a subsequent reaction, and thus, 
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the process continues. In other words, we mesh the flow of embod-
ied actions with one another in communication, as if we were play-
ing music or dancing together. Interactional synchrony is this type 
of well-timed and meaningful interpersonal coordination, the basis 
of which is the rhythmical circulation of action and reaction be-
tween the self and the other.
It is important to add that this circulation is based on the percep-
tion of each other’s action. From the enactive point of view, percep-
tion is not a process of passively receiving stimuli from the environ-
ment. On the contrary, it is a process of exploring possible action 
toward the environment based on embodied skills (Noë, 2004). Per-
ception itself is a potential action. In the context of interpersonal 
communication, therefore, the other’s action is perceived as one that 
affords the self to react in a certain manner. Conversely and in turn, 
the self’s action is perceived as one that affords the other to react in 
response to it. The self and the other reciprocally seek the potential 
action through each one’s perception, as a result of which the “inter-
action” is created. This view coincides with the idea of “enactive in-
tersubjectivity” proposed by Fuchs and De Jaegher (2009), who also 
try to develop the notion of intercorporeality.
Embodied interaction that is experienced as interactional syn-
chrony is in itself intersubjectively meaningful. Consider the case of 
an improvisation of jazz music. At a certain moment during the per-
formance, the synchronized interaction between players gains an 
autonomy as if it has a life of its own, outside of which each player 
would perform differently. As a result of this moment of emergence, 
they create a new and one-time-only tune through which the players 
comprehend each other. Thus, through the process of interactional 
synchrony, the other and the self co-experience the emergence of 
meaning, which does not necessarily take concrete forms. It often 
appears as various implicit moods of the interpersonal field, such as 
convivial, collaborative, cohesive, confrontational, and competitive. 
These moods comprise the context of social understanding, in which 
the self and the other come to understand each other mutually in an 
explicit way. As was shown in the case of newborns who synchro-
nize their movements to adults’ speech pattern, embodied interac-
tion of action-reaction precedes our ability of social understanding 
based on social norms and rules, and also underpins it. The notion 
of intercorporeality opens up the possibility of reconsidering our so-
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cial understanding, not as a communication between two Cartesian 
minds, but as a creation between two minded-bodies.
Concluding remarks
Thus far, I revisited Merleau-Ponty’s notion of intercorporeality and 
tried to lay the foundation for social cognition through it. Unlike 
current theories of social cognition that assume the other person’s 
mind to be private and hidden, Merleau-Ponty stressed the primal 
bodily resonance between the self’s body and that of the other. The 
self and the other can directly perceive intentions involved in each 
other’s actions, and thus can understand the meaning of them. As is 
discussed above, intercorporeality contains a perception-action loop 
between the self and the other. It appears as embodied interactions 
in two closely connected but different manners, that is, behavior 
matching and interactional synchrony. The former serves as the ba-
sis of empathy, and the latter produces various implicit moods of the 
interpersonal field. Providing descriptions of both patterns of inter-
corporeality, it is suggested that the most basic process of social un-
derstanding is a creation of meaning through embodied interac-
tions. The self’s body and that of the other are engaged through 
perception and action, and both begin to participate in “between”, 
outside of which the self and the other would feel and think dif-
ferently. The impersonal emotions, moods, atmospheres and am-
biances that are created in “between” may offer implicit contexts, 
within which the self and the other construct explicit mutual un-
derstanding through verbal communications. As is implied in the 
etymological sense of the word “communication”, the possible 
range of social understanding would be what can be made com-
mon between the self and the other. Intercorporeality that appears 
as embodied interactions is the most fundamental condition for 
such commonality.
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